The rationality of good-evil, which is one of the fundamental issues of theology and the methodology of jurisprudence, is important in terms of ontologically and epistemologically shaping the sects’ conceptions of divinity and prophethood. n the debates between the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites in the mutaqaddimūn period about good-evil, which took place based on the distinction between rationality and sharīʿah, the Muʿtazilites thought that good-evil could be known and affirmed by reason, while the Ashʿarites argued that sharʿī declaration was necessary for its confirmation. The Hanafīs, who had similar views with the Muʿtazilites before adopting Māturīdism, revised their acceptance of the issue of good-evil after their conversion to Māturīdism. The Hanafī-Māturīdīs made this revision by criticizing the principles of salāh-aslah and reason as the ruler, which were at the heart of the debates. One of the later Māturīdīs, Sadr al-Sharīʿa (d. 747/1346) subjected the two sides of the debate, the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿariyya, to a detailed and precise criticism and revealed the position of the Māturīdīs on the issue of good-evil in his work on the methodology of fiqh, al-Tawdīḥ. This criticism, which Sadr al-Sharīʿa built on four propositions, gained wide popularity among later theologians and methodologists and became known as “Muqaddimāt al-Arbaʿa / Four Propositions”. In this study, Sadr al-Sharīʿa’s original approach on behalf of the Māturīdīs on the issue of good-evil is analyzed in comparison with early Hanafī jurisprudence texts and the meaning formed through these texts is analyzed by using the method of discourse analysis. As a result of the analysis, it is determined that the Hanafī discourse until the 5th/11th century underwent a transformation in the later period that separated from Muʿtazilism and approached “Sunnism”.